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Abstract 
 
Ever since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms commencing in the 1980s, how to improve efficiency of state-
owned enterprises has been on the government agenda. Progress has been made but more slowly 
than one expects in the decade. Even worse, against all the odds, China’s large state-owned firms, 
mega-SOEs, the backbone of Maoist economy previously, have gained exponential growth in the past 
decade. Reforms of that part of the economy have stalled. Why? 
 
 To reveal the rationale and mechanisms of the rise of mega-SOEs, this study establishes a two-stage 
game model for an ‘authoritarian market economy’ (or a ‘market-Leninist economy’) where market 
monopoly and rent-seeking by state-owned conglomerates is firmly entrenched. Our findings confirm 
a ‘subgame perfect Nash equilibrium’ in China’s authoritarian market economy that has led the state 
(the owner or ‘principal’) and the large state-owned firms (the manager or the ‘agent’) to a paradox 
which prevents continuous reforms towards a Pareto solution for efficiency improvement.  
 
Keywords: authoritarian market economy, rent-seeking, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, SOEs, 
economic reforms, economic efficiency 
JEL classification codes:  D86, L13, P20, P26, P31 
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1. Introduction and motivations 
In the past several decades of economic reforms since Deng Xiaoping’s new leadership, a 
burning issue has been debated in terms of how to reform the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs, guoyou qiye, or guoqi) that have become dominated the economy ever since their 
systematic adoption in the 1950s from the late Soviet Union.
1
 These SOEs are 
notoriously inefficient. Hence, the issue of their reforms arises. As China has moved 
towards adoption of market mechanism in the past three decades,
2
 SOEs’ glory in China 
is repeatedly predicted over, à la the destiny of their counterparts in post-communist 
Eastern Europe and Russia (see Figure 1).
3
 This however has not yet happened. Instead, 
China’s SOEs have been re-adjusted, streamlined, and vindicated so that their influence 
goes on. 
   All the time the state visible hand has been busy helping SOEs as a whole. A few stages 
can be identified. In the beginning, from circa 1980 to 1995, the state advocated  limited 
degree of managerial autonomy without altering the state ownership: power 
decentralization (fangquan), profit retention (rangli) and contractual responsibility 
(chengbao zhi).
4
 This conservative approach did not reverse the downturn of the SOE 
sector which was now under the cross fire of the competition from state-of-art firms from 
the West on the other hand and that of highly motivated home-grown private operators on 
the other.  
   The second stage began in 1998. During his term in office Premier Zhu Rongji initiated 
a reform known as ‘to invigorate large enterprises and let go small ones’ (zhuada 
                                                          
1
 In accordance with Lin, Cai and Li, inefficiency of SOEs in China is an endogenous agency problem from 
the Soviet administratively planned economy. The symptoms include a lack of managerial autonomy in 
decision-making, a lack of incentives for profits, soft budget constraints, and so on; see J. Lin, Fang Cai, 
and Zhou Li, ‘Competition, Policy Burdens and State-Owned Enterprise Reform’, The American Economic 
Review, 88/2 (1998), pp. 422-7.  
2
 After its TWO membership since 2001, although having a market, China has not yet been granted the 
status of a market economy. 
3
 J. Bennett, J. Maw, and S. Estrin, ‘Why Did Transition Economies Choose Mass Privatisation?’, Journal 
of the European Economic Association, 3/2-3 (2005), pp. 567-75. 
4
 C. Bai, J. Lu, and Z. Tao, ‘The Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform: Empirical Evidence from 
China’, The American Economic Review, 96/2 (2006), pp. 353-7. 
 2 
fangxiao).
5
 The government concern was that in a communist country large state-owned 
enterprises (yangqi) ultimately determine and dictate the political colour of the economy.
6
 
Small and medium firms were politically less important and their privatisation did no 
political harm to the communist ruling. Consequently, from 1998 to 2008, about 80 
percent SOEs were under the knife for privatisation: inefficient SOEs either went 
bankrupt or were sold cheaply to private owners. China’s reforms have allegedly reduced 
the aggregate number of the state-owned enterprises, as demonstrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Decline in the Total Number of Industrial SOEs, 1996-2012 
 
Source: ‘State-owned enterprises’,  
http://finance.caijing.com.cn/20150120/3803161.shtml, available on 20
th
 January, 2017. 
 
   What is less known, however, is that many such firms did not die. They were simply 
combined and re-structured to consolidate into new state-owned conglomerates of even 
                                                          
5
 J. Wu, Contemporary China’s Economic Reforms (Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Press, 2003). 
6
 R. Garnaut and Y. Huang, Growth without Miracles: Readings on the Chinese Economy in the Era of 
Reform (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 286-7. 
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 3 
greats sizes in order to maintain the share of SOEs in the national economy.
7
 As the real 
deduction made exclusively among small firms, large SOEs have took off in an all-
rounded fashion: their number, assets, bank loans, profits and workforce (see Figures 2-
4).  
 
Figure 2. Rise of the Number of Mega-SOEs, 2005-2013 
 
 
 
Source: ‘State-owned enterprises’, www.wind.com.cn, available on 10th February, 
2017. 
 
  
                                                          
7
 C. Hsieh and Zheng (M.) Song, ‘Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small: The Transformation of the State 
Sector in China’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2015, pp. 295-346. 
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Figure 3. Rise of the Total Bank Loans (Liability) and Net Assets of Mega-SOEs, 2005-
2013 
 
 
Source: ‘State-owned enterprises’, www.wind.com.cn, available on 10th February, 
2017. 
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 5 
Figure 4. Rise of the Total Workforce Hired by Mega-SOEs, 2005-2013 
 
 
 
Source: ‘State-owned enterprises’, www.wind.com.cn, available on 10th February, 
2017. 
 
   SOEs have maintained a heavy weight in the Chinese economy: throughout the 2000s 
the SOE sector hired 40 percent of China’s urban workforce; 8  the top 100 SOEs 
possessed 35 percent of all corporate assets in China; state-owned banks practically 
                                                          
8
 Q. Sun and W. H. S. Tong, ‘China Share Issue Privatisation: The Extent of Its Success’, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 70 (2003), pp. 183-222; C. A. Holz, China’s Industrial State-Owned Enterprises: 
Between Profitability and Bankruptcy (Singapore: World Scientific Press, 2003) 
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 6 
controlled all the capital in the banking sector.
9
 Such a move marked the beginning of the 
‘red zaibatsu era’ in China’s contemporary business history: now large SOE 
conglomerates, or ‘mega-SOEs’ (yangqi), control China’s key economic sectors more 
firmly than ever before,
10
 similar to privileged conglomerates zaibatsu in modern Japan 
but under the banner of communism, hence the term ‘red zaibatsu’.11 Most tellingly, 
profitability of the state sector seems to be superior to its private counterpart all the time 
(see Figure 5). 
 
  
                                                          
9
 B. Young, ‘The Asian Growth Models and Asia Challenges’, 2nd Annual OECD WPC World Pensions 
and Investments Forum, 2017): http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/49720953.pdf. 
10
 Such as those in the energy, transport, telecommunication, defence, banking and finance sectors today. 
11
 The contemporary Chinese terms is da-er. 
 7 
Figure 5. Profitability of State-Controlled Firms and Private Firms, 1999-2009 
 
 
 
Source: Based on the own calculations of authors. The data are collected from Wind 
Information database, www.wind.com.cn; National Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo 
Daxing Gongye Qiye Nianjian (Chinese Large Industrial Enterprises Yearbook) (Beijing, 
Statistical Press, 1999-2009). 
 
   To prove the point further, after becoming SOEs, non-SOEs become infected by 
gigantism. From our data, 126 companies have changed from non-SOEs to SOEs, and 
239 from SOEs to non-SOEs. In Figure 6, the vertical line represents a base-year (Year 1, 
when the change happened) and those years before the change (with a negative value, for 
example, “-1” implying one year before the change happened) and after the change (with 
a positive value, for example, “2” implies the second year after the change happened). 
The horizontal line shows size of asset (in RMB￥). The change makes ex-non-SOEs 
growing larger. 
 
Figure 6. Size Changes due to Non-SOEs Becoming SOEs, and Vice Versa  
0
2
4
6
8
R
e
tu
rn
 o
n
 A
s
s
e
ts
 (
P
e
rc
e
n
t)
2000 2005 2010
Year
State-controlled Firms Private Firms
 8 
 
 
Source: Wind Financial Terminal Database, vide www.wind.com.cn. 
Note: Year 1 is the time when the change happened. Year 1 is thus not any calendar year 
but the year when a firm makes a switch. So, Year 1 thus varies from firm to firm. 
 
   One may safely assume that such a development does not happen randomly but is well 
planned. It is thus worth mapping evolutionary changes of SOEs in post-Mao China. In 
the beginning, from circa 1980 to 1995, the state permitted  limited degree of managerial 
autonomy without altering the state ownership, known as (1) power decentralization 
(fangquan), (2) profit retention (rangli) and (3) contractual responsibility (chengbao 
zhi).
12
 This conservative approach did not reverse the downturn of the SOE sector which 
was under the cross fire of market competition from state-of-art firms from the West on 
the other hand and that of highly motivated home-grown private operators on the other. 
As result, a third of them ran businesses into the red.
13
 The reform did not work. The 
second stage began in 1998. During his term in office Premier Zhu Rongji initiated a 
                                                          
12
 C. Bai, J. Lu, and Z. Tao, ‘The Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform: Empirical Evidence from 
China’, The American Economic Review, 96/2 (2006), pp. 353-7. 
13
 Q. Sun and W. H. S. Tong, ‘China Share Issue Privatisation: The Extent of Its Success’, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 70 (2003), pp. 183-222.  
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reform ‘to invigorate large enterprises and let go small ones’ (zhuada fangxiao).14 The 
key dogmatic concern is that in a communist country large state-owned enterprises 
(yangqi) ultimately determine and dictate the political colour of the economy.
15
 Small 
firms are politically less important and their privatisation cause less political harm to the 
communist rule.
16
 Consequently, from 1998 to 2008, as many as 80 percent SOEs were 
either combined into mega-firms or under the knife for bankruptcy/privatisation and thus 
reduced the aggregate number of the state-owned enterprises (see Figure 1). The third 
stage came in the wake of the 2008 global banking crisis and during Premier Wen 
Jiabao’s term in office. This time the SOE sector went for an overdrive. The new 
strategies were (1) to ‘create bigger and stronger SOEs to expand beyond China’s 
territory’ (zuoda zuoqiang, zou chuqu), and (2) to ‘expand SOEs at the expanses of the 
private sector’ (guojin mintui) side by side with the government stimulus package of four 
trillion RMB yuan whose beneficiaries were almost exclusive meg-SOEs.
17
 In this 
context, further privatisation of the SOE sector has not only been thrown out of the 
window but also become an ideological taboo.  
   The question is whether the rise of mega-SOEs automatically mean that they are now 
more efficient than private firms. If they are, deepening reforms in the state sector 
becomes unnecessary. Or, the mega-SOEs’ high profitability has little to do with their 
market efficiency and competitiveness. After all, in neo-classical economics, there is a 
model concerning monopoly and oligopoly with which profitability is not linked to 
                                                          
14
 J. Wu, Contemporary China’s Economic Reforms (Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Press, 2003). 
15
 R. Garnaut and Y. Huang, Growth without Miracles: Readings on the Chinese Economy in the Era of 
Reform. Oxford (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 286-7. 
16
 This raises a question whether the Chinese system is ‘state capitalism’; see Xi, Li, X. Liu, and Y. Wang, 
‘A Model of China’s State Capitalism’, HKUST IEMS Working Paper, February 2015. 
17
 Wu J., ‘Guojin Mintui’ (Expansion of SOEs at the Expanses of the Private Sector), Shangwu Zhoukan 
(Business Weekly), 24 (2009), pp. 20-1; Deng Wei, ‘Guojin Mintuide Xueshu Lunzheng Jiqi Xia Yibu’ 
(Debate on Expansion of SOEs at the Expanses of the Private Sector), Gaige (Reforms), 4 (2010), pp. 39-
46; Ge Z., ‘Guojin Mintuide Benzhi Yu Zhongguo Shichang Jingji Tizhi Jiangou’ (Essence of Expansion of 
SOEs at the Expanses of the Private Sector and Construction of China’s Market Economy), 1/10 (2010), 
pp. 43-7. 
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economic efficiency but economic rent. This sheds light on our understanding of the 
entrenchment and expansion of mega-SOEs in the era of red zaibatsu in China. 
   The reality is that financial or accounting gains achieved by large state-owned firms 
continue to be associated with an old ownership framework.
18
 Granted, the post-Mao 
economic reforms made the Soviet system more malleable than it was originally designed. 
This mutant Soviet system can be called ‘authoritarian market economy’ which operates 
in a distorted market and yields monopolistic rent as the main characteristics of large 
SOEs in China. For our purpose, it is better to define SOEs as a phenomenon of 
‘authoritarian market economy’ rather than ‘state-capitalism’ to capture both the origin 
and essence of the ‘SOE economy’.19  This is because the state constantly exerts its 
administrative power to manipulate the market and milk the economy for rent.  
   In this context, SOEs are merely a means for the state’s end, whatever the end might be. 
Three such aspects of the state’s end can be identified: (1) ‘policy burdens’ (artificially 
imposed targets beyond the healthy economic function of the enterprise),
20
 (2) ‘soft 
budget’ (meaning that firms will not made liable if they cannot deliver their performance 
targets), and (3) business conglomeration or ‘business empire-building’ (meaning 
business diversification). Policy load forces SOEs to operate inside the production 
possibility frontier instead along it by employing more labour than they technically need 
in order to fulfil mandatory government social-warfare targets at the expanse of SOEs’ 
economic efficiency. This is the stick. Soft budget, the prevailing form of government 
                                                          
18
 It has been argued that the high profitability of SOEs appears exclusively from the closed ‘upper stream’ 
infrastructure sector of the Chinese economy that is controlled by the state through exploitation of the open 
‘lower stream’ manufacturing sector of the economy; see Zhang Jun, China’s Unfinished Reform 
(Singapore: World Scientific Publisher, 2013), ch. 1. 
19
 The concept of ‘market-Leninism’ was coined in 1993 by the American journalist Nicholas Kristof who 
argued that the key feature of market-Leninism in China is that the state uses its centralised administrative 
power to promote the economic growth with a degree of liberalisation of a planned economy. The later 
terms ‘authoritarian market economy’ and ‘market authoritarianism’ were created by Stefan Halper in his 
book The Beijing Consensus (2010). The influence of SOEs, currently prevailing in the Chinese economy, 
illustrates such a ‘heretic market form’ in full swing. 
20
 Such burdens commonly take the forms of (1) extra labour-hiring quotas beyond the optimal size of the 
workforce for a firm, and (2) low return investment projects that no other investors are interested. 
 11 
finance, is then used to compensate SOEs’ suboptimal performance. Thanks to generous 
soft budget moribund mega-SOEs in China have not only remained unscathed but also 
magnified. This is the carrot. These two always come as a pair. Both are endogenous for 
China’s authoritarian market economy. Intuitively, such a system that rewards SOEs’ 
economic inefficiency will not last. But in reality, the SOE sector flourishes and expands 
by gobbling up market after market, sector after sector, region after region, and on its 
way to take on the world. Indeed, almost all Chinese companies on the world top 500 
league table are mega-SOEs. In the process, they conquer more market and hire more 
workers. Against all the odds, ‘two wrongs’ - policy burdens and soft budget -  make a 
right. But there is a catch: the soft budget is financed by rent yielded somewhere from the 
authoritarian market economy. The loop is now complete. 
   Aggressive diversification in capital investment and increase in workforce hired by 
mega-SOEs strengthen the legitimacy and raison d’etre for the party-state in China. So 
much so, China’s SOEs are seen as the embodiment of ‘state capitalism’.21 In this context, 
mega-SOEs are the state per se in China. The result is institutionalised distortion of the 
Chinese economy.  
   We argue that (1) market monopoly for monopolistic rent rather than operational 
efficiency is the paramount concern of both the state and the mega-SOEs, in turn rent 
extraction facilitates policy load-bearing; (2) there exists no incentive for stakeholders - 
the state and the SOEs - to give up monopoly because China’s authoritarian market 
economy created a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which no players have 
incentives to reform unilaterally; (3) without political will, the current reform deadlock 
will continue indefinitely.   
   The remainder of the study is organized as the follows: Section 2 is devoted to a review 
of literature; Section 3 offers a statistical model; Section 4 contains a 
theoretical/mathematical framework for the rise and expansion of mega-SOEs; Section 5 
offers final remarks.  
 
2. Literature review 
                                                          
21
 A. Szamosszegi and C. Kyle, ‘An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China’, 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 26, 2011. 
 12 
   Generally speaking, opinions are divided into two camps. One sees a reduction of 
government policy burdens and hardening soft budget on mega-SOEs as the pragmatic 
way to solve the inefficiency problem of the SOEs; the other sees changes in firms’ 
ownership (hence privatisation of mega-SOEs) as the panacea for reversing poor 
performance. 
   Regarding causes for SOE inefficiency, there are the aforementioned ‘policy burdens’ 
and ‘soft budget’. The former was used to fulfil government’s general social welfare 
schemes;
 22
 and the latter, to rescue firms in difficulty due to the burdensome schemes.
23
 
The negative impact of policy burdens have been well analysed. Types of government 
mandatory policy burdens on SOEs have been identified as compulsory labour-hiring 
quotas for excessive workers, often unskilled and technically redundant, together with 
their welfare entitlement packages.
24
 Moreover, there is compulsory extra investment, 
ignoring China’s absolute or comparative advantages. 25  From the viewpoint of neo-
classical economics, the removal of these burdens is the sine qua non for any efficiency 
                                                          
22
 E.g. J. Lin and G. Tan, ‘Policy Burdens, Accountability, and the Soft Budget Constraint’, American 
Economic Review, 89/2 (1999), pp. 426-31; X. Dong and L. Putterman, ‘Soft Budget Constraints, Social 
Burdens, and Labour Redundancy in China’s State Industry’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31/1 
(2003), pp. 110-33; L. Li, ‘Employment Burden, Government Ownership and Soft Budget Constraints: 
Evidence from a Chinese Enterprise Survey’, China Economic Review, 19/2 (2008), pp. 215-29; J. Lin and 
Z. Li, ‘Policy Burden, Privatization and Soft Budget Constraint’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 36/1 
(2008), pp. 90-102.   
23
 C. Bai and Y. Wang, ‘Bureaucratic Control and the Soft Budget Constraint’, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 26/1 (1998), pp. 41-61; Y. Cao, Y. Qian, and B. R. Weingast, ‘From Federalism, Chinese 
Style, to Privatisation, Chinese Style’, Economics of Transition, 7/1 (1999), pp. 103-31; M. Dewatripont 
and G. Roland, ‘Soft Budget Constraints, Transition and Financial Systems’, Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 156/1 (2000), pp. 245-60; R. Garnaut and Y. Huang, Growth without Miracles: 
Readings on the Chinese Economy in the Era of Reform (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 112. 
24
 J. Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li, ‘The Lessons of China’s Transition to a Market Economy’, Cato Journal, 
16/2 (1996), pp. 201-31; J. Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li, ‘Competition, Policy Burdens and State-Owned 
Enterprise Reform’, The American Economic Review, 88/2 (1998), pp. 422-7; J. Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou 
Li, The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform (Hong Kong: The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong Press, 2003). 
25
 It means that a considerable proportion of the state sector’s workforce is technically redundant.  
 13 
improvement in the SOE sector.
26
 Such improvement will make privatisation 
unnecessary.
27
 Similarly, studies argue that firms’ autonomy from the state, or freedom of 
the ‘agent’ from the ‘principal’, will improve SEOs’ efficiency.28 Others go as far as 
suggesting that SOE bureaucrat-managers should be replaced by ‘real capitalists’.29  
   Meanwhile, it is agreed that policy burdens need soft budge to support.
30
 As a pillar of 
the institution in China, such soft-budget cannot become ‘hardened’ without some 
fundamental political changes. So, alternatively, reforms may be carried out on soft 
budget. It is argued that a change in the rule of the game by stopping soft budget will 
                                                          
26
 J. Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); 
Andrei Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, ‘Politicians and Firms’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109/4 
(1994), pp. 995-1025; J. Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li, ‘The Lessons of China’s Transition to a Market 
Economy’, Cato Journal, 16/2 (1996), pp. 201-31; J. Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li, ‘Competition, Policy 
Burdens and State-Owned Enterprise Reform’, The American Economic Review, 88/2 (1998), pp. 422-7; J. 
Lin and G. Tan, ‘Policy Burdens, Accountability, and the Soft Budget Constraint’, American Economic 
Review, 89/2 (1999), pp. 426-31; J. Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li, State-owned Enterprise Reform in China 
(Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2001); L. C. Xu, Tian Zhu, and Y. Lin, 
‘Politician Control, Agency Problems and Ownership Reform: Evidence from China’, Economics of 
Transition, 13/1 (2005), pp. 1-24. 
27
 J. Bennett, J. Maw, and S. Estrin, ‘Why Did Transition Economies Choose Mass Privatisation?’ Journal 
of the European Economic Association, 3/2-3 (2005), pp. 567-75; J. Lin and Z. Li, ‘Policy Burden, 
Privatization and Soft Budget Constraint’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 36/1 (2008), pp. 90-102. 
28
 W. Zhang, ‘Decision Rights, Residual Claim and Performance: A Theory of How the Chinese State 
Enterprise Reform Works’, China Economic Review, 8/1 (1997), pp. 67-82; W. Zhang, ‘A Principal-agent 
Theory of the Public Economy and Its Applications to China’, Economics of Planning, 31/2 (1998), pp. 
231-51. 
29
 W. Zhang, ‘China’s SOE Reform: A Corporate Governance Perspective’, Corporate Ownership and 
Control, 3/4 (2006), pp. 132-50. 
30
 E. C. Perotti, L. Sun, and L. Zhou, ‘State-owned versus Township and Village Enterprises in China’, 
Comparative Economic Studies, 41/2-3 (1999), pp. 151-79; C. Bai, D. Li, Z. Tao, and Y. Wang, ‘A 
Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 28/4 (2000), pp.  
716−38; X. Dong and L. Putterman, ‘Soft Budget Constraints, Social Burdens, and Labour Redundancy in 
China’s State Industry’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31/1 (2003), pp. 110-33; L. Li, ‘Employment 
Burden, Government Ownership and Soft Budget Constraints: Evidence from a Chinese Enterprise 
Survey’, China Economic Review, 19/2 (2008), pp. 215-29; J. Lin and Z. Li, ‘Policy Burden, Privatization 
and Soft Budget Constraint’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 36/1 (2008), pp. 90-102. 
 14 
remove incentives among SOE managers.
31
 As soft-budget is determined by the Leninist 
political economy in China, its removal is much harder than one might think. The ‘soft 
budget–poor performance’ causality may be very stubborn.  
    Needless to say, there is school of thought that views privatisation as the panacea for 
SOEs’ inefficiency,32 despite the fact that SOEs yield handsome profits until now.33 A 
general equilibrium model has been developed to explain why mega-SOEs in China yield 
more profits than non-SOEs from the viewpoint of value chain where SOEs monopolise 
‘upstream’ industries to rip off non-SOEs in ‘downstream’ industries for rent,34 a legacy 
of the Soviet/Leninist ‘scissors’ pricing’ (jiandao cha) under Mao to accumulate capital 
for large-scale heavy industry mainly for the military.
35
  
   But so far, very few scholars have investigated the rationale and dynamics of the rise of 
China’s red zaibatsu – the mega-SOEs. Rather, most attention has been paid to how to 
dissolve SOEs in the name of neo-classical free market. Such an approach is outdated and 
misleading, because it cannot explain why mega-SOEs have flourished and reforms of 
mega-SOEs have stalled. 
                                                          
31
 J. Lin and Z. Li, ‘Policy Burden, Privatization and Soft Budget Constraint’, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 36/1 (2008), pp. 90-102. 
32
 J. Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1992; 
A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, ‘Politicians and Firms’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109/4 (1994), 
pp. 995-1025; W. Zhang, ‘Decision Rights, Residual Claim and Performance: A Theory of How the 
Chinese State Enterprise Reform Works’, China Economic Review, 8/1 (1997), pp. 67-82; W. Zhang, ‘A 
Principal-agent Theory of the Public Economy and Its Applications to China’, Economics of Planning, 31/2 
(1998), pp. 231-51; S. Estrin, J. Hanousek, E. Kovenda, and J. Svejnar, ‘The Effects of Privatisation and 
Ownership in Transition Economies’, Journal of Economic Literature, 47/3 (2009), pp. 1-30. 
33
 Based on a dataset of 50,000 Chinese SOEs from 1998 to 2003, Tong argues that the speed and scale of 
privatisation improved SOEs’ performance in China. We now know that these firms were all small and 
medium ones; see S. Y. Tong, ‘Why Privatize or Why Not? Empirical Evidence from China’s SOEs 
Reform’, China Economic Review, 20/3 (2009), pp. 402-13. 
34
 Wang Yong, ‘Guoyou Qiyede Chenfu Luoji He Jiegou Weizhi’ (Growth Dynamics and Structural 
Location of SOEs in China) 2015, unpublished paper, vide www.aisixiang.com/data/93066.html. 
35
 Kent Deng, Mapping China’s Growth and Development in the Long Run, 221 BC to 2020 (Singapore: 
World Scientific Press and Imperial College Press, 2015), pp. 164, 172, 190. 
 15 
   This study establishes a statistical model and a two-stage game model for an 
‘authoritarian market economy’ where market monopoly and rent-seeking by state-owned 
conglomerates is firmly entrenched. Our findings confirm a ‘subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium’ in China’s economy that has led the state (the owner or ‘principle’) and the 
large state-owned firms (the manager or the ‘agent’) to a paradox which prevents 
continuous reforms towards a Pareto solution for efficiency improvement; as a result, 
further ownership reforms become very hard if not entirely impossible. 
 
3. Statistical model and analysis 
3.1. Empirical evidence 
   In this part, we aim to prove empirically three underlying incentives for both the state 
and the manager to enlarge SOEs to make the red zaibatsu a reality in China: i.e. (1) the 
SOE manager is interested in increasing his/her benefits; (2) the state wants more tax 
revenue (direct taxes as proxies), and (3) secures ‘social welfare’ in terms of increasing 
labour hiring in society for its legitimacy to rule the country. We first apply ‘Three Stage 
Least Square’ (3SLS) to estimate simultaneous equations with the three incentives being 
the explained variables. This is then followed by Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition to 
identify, in percentage terms, the contribution made by each incentive to the size 
difference between SOEs and non-SOEs, as well as between mega-SOEs and lesser SOEs 
(or small and medium SOEs). Such a comparative investigation will identify the 
dominant reason why the size of SOEs keeps on increasing. 
 
3.2. Definition of variables  
   We define ‘SOEs’ as those business entities with their effective holders being one of 
the following: (1) central and local state apparatus, (2) State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commissions (SASAC) of both the national and local levels.  
   We use the amount of asset to measure the size of a company. In China, companies’ 
assets vary from the minimum of RMB￥84,000 to the maximum of RMB￥2,200 billion. 
We adopt log of asset instead of the absolute value to avoid being affected by extreme 
sums. Mega-SOEs are those whose assets are larger than the 90 percentile for the 
convenience of our assessment.  
 16 
   To quantify the impact of the three incentives on the firm size, we opt for remuneration 
of firm executive directors, government revenues from business taxes, and the employed 
workers to measure the manager’s benefit in terms of material reward and the state 
benefit regarding taxes, and labour hiring, respectively. Moreover, the firm’s net profit 
and the GDP growth rate of the national economy are controlled in our modelling. The 
justification is to be provided in Section 3.3. 
   Our sample includes 2,887 listed firms in stock markets in both A-share markets and B-
share markets from 2004 to 2015,
36
 totalling 23,856 observations. Among them, 11,837 
are SOEs; and 1,891 mega-SOEs. Definitions and sources of all variables used in this 
study are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Definitions and sources of all variables 
 
Category Name Definition Source* 
Size Asset ln(asset) 
Wind Financial 
Terminal Database, 
vide 
www.wind.com.cn 
Incentives 
Personal 
benefits 
ln(remuneration of executive 
directors)  
Government 
taxes 
ln(income tax + business tax) 
Labour hiring ln(number of total employees) 
Control 
Profit 
If net profit is larger than 0, it is 
ln(net profit); otherwise –ln(-net 
profit) 
GDP GDP growth rate 
World Bank 
Database, vide 
data.worldbank.org 
 
Note: * For detail, please see Appendix. 
 
3.3. Three incentives to enlarge mega-SOEs 
                                                          
36
 Mainland China runs two stock exchanges, in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Both have A- and B-share 
markets. The key distinction is that A-shares are denominated in renminbi and B-shares in foreign 
currencies (US dollars in Shanghai and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen). See Financial Times, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/. 
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   To prove the three incentives in question that determines the size of a mega-SOE, 
following simultaneous equations are constructed: 
 
1 11 12 13 1
2 21 22 23 2
3 31 32 3
it it it t it
it it it it it
it it it it
Benefits Asset Profit GDP
Taxes Asset Benefits Profit
Employees Asset GDP
    
    
   
    

    
    
 
 
Here, the amount of asset is the explanatory variable in all the three equations. In the first 
equation, the explained variable is personal benefits for the manager. Net profit of each 
company that year and China’s GDP growth rate are controlled, because both have 
impacts on the manager’s remuneration according to Cosh and Zhang and Huang.37 In the 
second equation, the explained and control variables are taxes, personal benefits for the 
manager and net profit, respectively. Personal benefits for the manager are controlled 
because as a part of the cost, they reduce tax revenues for the government. Net profit is 
also controlled since governments can collect more tax from more profitable companies. 
The last equation shows labour  hiring with GDP controlled à la Havlik and Landesmann; 
Bradshaw and Stenning.38 Parameters  ,   and   represent intercepts, coefficients and 
residual errors, respectively; i and t, the ith company and year t. 
   We notice that as the explained variable on the left hand side in the first equation, 
benefits for the manager can also be a control variable on the right hand side. This makes 
it endogenous. To solve the problem of endogeneity and to evaluate the simultaneous 
equations, we use 3SLS, which consider the three equations as a whole system. Only in 
this way can one estimate the coefficients efficiently, because interaction between 
residual errors of the three equations is considered in 3SLS. In the regression, effects of 
                                                          
37
 A. Cosh, ‘The remuneration of chief executives in the United Kingdom’, The Economic Journal, 85/337 
(1975), pp. 75-94; J. Zhang and T. Huang, ‘What Determines Chinese Firms’ Salaries’, China Industrial 
Economics 3 (2010), p. 8. 
38
 M. Bradshaw and A. Stenning, East Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union: the Post-socialist 
States (London: Routledge, 2016); P. Havlik and M. Landesmann, ‘Structural Change, Productivity and 
Employment in the New EU Member States’, Working Paper, Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies, No. 313, 2005. 
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different industries and years are also controlled in each equation as dummy variables. 
The regression results of 3SLS are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. 3SLS Regression Results 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z 
 
Benefits    
Asset 0.28
***
 0.00 58.61 
Profits 0.01
***
 0.00 22.73 
GDP 0.76
***
 0.01 69.43 
 
Taxes    
Asset 1.22
***
 0.02 75.90 
Benefits -0.67
***
 0.03 -25.23 
Profit 0.04
***
 0.00 40.96 
 
Employees    
Asset 0.19
***
 0.01 17.52 
GDP 0.35
***
 0.02 14.40 
 
 
Equations 
Observation Parameter RMSE chi2 
Benefits 11478 31 0.64 6210000.00
***
 
Taxes 11478 31 1.18 2600000.00
***
 
Employees 11478 30 1.46 309572.28
***
 
 
Source: See Appendix. 
Note:  
*** 
present significant at 1% respectively, and hereinafter the same. 
 
   According the results listed above in Table 2, all the coefficients of itAsset  are 
significantly positive, i.e. the larger the firm, the higher the benefits for managers, and the 
more taxes collected by the governments, and the more labour-hiring opportunity. 
Therefore, the three incentives are correlated to the size of mega-SOEs.  
Meanwhile, coefficients of the control variables are also significant and consistent with 
our expectations. In the first equation, the higher the firm’s net profit and the GDP 
growth rate of the national economy, the higher the benefits for the SOE manager, which 
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is reasonable as the manager gains more when his/her company is more profitable and the 
whole national economy expands. In the second equation, more benefits received by the 
manager increase business costs and reduce tax revenues, while more profitable 
companies pay more taxes. In the last equation, when the GDP growth rate of the national 
economy is high, SOEs provide more jobs as expected. 
 
3.3. Dominant incentive for meg-SOEs to expand 
   The previous regression results confirm the three incentives to increase the size of 
SOEs. However, which one is dominant remains unclear, let alone the contributory 
weight of each incentive to the size difference between SOEs and non-SOEs, or that 
between mega-SOEs and lesser SOEs. To tackle these issues, we introduce Oaxaca-
Blinder Decomposition to our analysis.39 We use the two-fold method to decompose the 
difference in size of companies:40 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = [𝐸(𝑋1) − 𝐸(𝑋2)]′𝛽
∗ + [𝐸(𝑋1)
′(𝛽1 − 𝛽
∗) + 𝐸(𝑋2)
′(𝛽∗ − 𝛽2)] 
 
Here we denote Group 1 as possessing more asset than Group 2. X is a vector containing 
predictors and a constant, β contains the slope parameters and the intercept, and 𝛽∗ is the 
non-discriminatory coefficients vectors. The first part on the right-hand side is the 
                                                          
39
 This method was firstly used in finding out the causes of difference in income between females and 
males; see R. Oaxaca, ‘Male-female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets’, International Economic 
Review 14/3 (1973), pp. 693-709; A. S. Blinder, ‘Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural 
Estimates’, Journal of Human Resources 8/4 (1973), pp. 436-55. It was gradually applied to other fields to 
analyse causes of differences such as obesity and urban-rural inequality; see D. R. Taber, W. R. Robinson, 
S. N. Bleich, and Y. C. Wang, ‘Deconstructing Race and Gender Differences in Adolescent Obesity: 
Oaxaca‐Blinder Decomposition’, Obesity 24/3 (2016), pp. 719-26; F. L. A. Castro, W. A. Diamada, K. L. 
Guevara, and V. Manalang. ‘Is the Grass Really Greener on the Other Side? Decomposing Urban-Rural 
Inequality in the Philippines’, unpublished paper (2016).   
40
 B. Jann, ‘A Stata Implementation of the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition’, Stata Journal 8/4 (2008), pp. 
453-79. 
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explainable part, i.e. size difference in firms is caused by the aforementioned three 
incentives and control variables (the firm’s net profit and the GDP growth rate of the 
national economy), while the second part is the size difference caused by all other factors, 
which are hard to measure and not important to the present study. To be comprehensive, 
we first decompose the size difference between SOEs and non-SOEs, and secondly that 
between mega-SOEs and lesser SOEs. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Results 
 
Asset 
(1) SOEs vs (2) non-SOEs (1) Mega-SOEs vs (2) lesser SOEs 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z % Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z % 
Prediction 1 22.14
***
 0.01 1619.52   24.61*** 0.03 861.07   
Prediction 2 21.30
***
 0.01 2077.11   21.67*** 0.01 2258.67 
 Difference 0.85
***
 0.02 49.47 100 2.93
***
 0.03 97.37 100 
Benefits 0.02
***
 0.00 4.88 1.78 0.22
***
 0.01 19.72 7.45 
Taxes 0.41
***
 0.01 31.75 47.93 1.21
***
 0.03 46.03 41.17 
Employees 0.02
***
 0.00 10.22 1.96 0.03
***
 0.00 8.28 1.12 
Controls -0.02
***
 0.00 -7.21 -2.21 0.01
***
 0.01 1.18 0.22 
Explained  0.42
***
 0.01 28.28 49.46 1.47
***
 0.03 56.76 49.95 
Other 0.43
***
 0.01 40.52 50.54 1.47
***
 0.02 64.96 50.05 
Obs 23111    11478    
 
 
   According to Table 3, the size difference between SOEs and non-SOEs seen from 
ln( )asset  is 0.85, and 47.93% of the size change can be attributed to the tax incentive. 
The attribution to increase in labour-hiring accounts only for 1.96%, and that to the 
manager’s benefits is mere 1.78%. Therefore, the government tax incentive overshadows 
the other two incentives.  
   Moreover, the size difference between mega-SOEs and lesser SOEs is 2.93, larger than 
that between SOEs and non-SOEs. But, government tax incentive is still dominant, 
attributing 41.17% to the size difference. However, benefits for managers of mega-SOEs 
seem more influential, claiming 7.45% of the weight in deciding the firm size. The social 
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welfare incentive to increase labour-hiring opportunity only contributes 1.12%, far 
smaller than its counterparts.  
   In this decomposition, the state incentives for tax revenues loom large which is fully 
compatible with the authoritarian market model (or market-Leninism). In such a power 
asymmetry, the SOE manager has small slice of the pie while the benefits of ordinary 
workers are optional. 
 
4. Mathematic model and theorisation 
    Now, we take one step further to establish a theoretical model to explain the 
mechanisms behind the rapid growth of mega-SOEs in China. 
   4.1. Basic environment. Suppose that a market is under monopoly of a mega-SOE 
with a tendency of empire-building, according to studies by Baumol, Grossman and Hart,  
Hart and Moore, and  Stulz,
41
 without ownership of a mega-SOE, its manager tends to 
maximize his/her  total revenue from the an enlarged size of the firm (hence empire-
building). We denote this behaviour as 𝑇𝑅𝑚.
42
  
   Suppose also that the degree of privatisation of a mega-SOE is 𝛽, and 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤1. The 
manager’s personal benefit function 𝑅𝑚 = 𝛽𝜋0 + (1 − 𝛽) 𝑇𝑅𝑚
 
, where (1 − 𝛽) 𝑇𝑅𝑚  is 
the ‘business empire-building effect’. 
   When 𝛽 = 1, this SOE is full privatized, the manager will choose to maximise profit.  
When 𝛽 = 0, the SOE remains state-owned, the manager to will choose to maximise 
revenue and becomes a business empire builder.  
                                                          
41
 W. J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); S. 
G. and O. Hart, ‘One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 20/1-2 (1988), pp. 175-202; O. Hart and J. Moore, ‘Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the 
Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management’, American Economic Review 85 (1995), pp. 567-585; 
R. M. Stulz, ‘Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies’, Journal of Financial Economics, 
26/1 (1990), pp. 3-27. 
42
 The benefit for managers depends their ‘control rights’; so when they do not own their firms they 
maximise total sales instead of total profit; see W. J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and Growth 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). 
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   An over-sized SOE with business empire-building does two things in a win-win 
situation: (1) it bears more policy burdens to suit the state; and (2) it produces more 
revenue to benefit the manager individually. Inevitably, the firm will not be efficient. But 
it does not matter because all the extra costs can be shifted to other producers and 
consumers through monopolistic pricing.  
    4.2. Demand curve for the mega-SOE. The monopolistic SOE faces an inverse 
demand curve p = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑞, where p is market price; and intercept a, the price level when 
the output produced is at 0; b is a positive parameter, b > 1; q is the output. 
4.3. Cost function for the mega-SOE.  The cost function for the monopolistic SOE is 
constructed as: 𝐶𝑚 = 𝑘𝑞
2, where k is a positive parameter, and k > 1. Cm is the cost of 
this mega-SOE for any given output. Its function kq
2
 is increasing as well as convex. 
When the of output increases, the cost increases faster, hence efficiency suffers. 
4.4. Rent yielded by the mega-SOE. SOEs’ monopolistic pricing leads to rent. The 
rent is then shared between the firm (including the manager) and the state through 
government taxes on ‘profit’ (rent in real terms).43 The average total cost of this mega-
SOE after profit taxes  can be denoted as 𝐴𝑇𝐶𝑝 =
𝑇𝐶
𝑞
 + w = kq + w, where ATCp is the 
average total cost; TC, total cost; w, a positive fixed-cost shifter parameter to measure the 
degree of the rent share by the state. The state economic return can be constructed as 𝑅𝐿= 
[𝐴𝐶𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 − 𝐴𝐶]  ×  𝑞 = wq, where 𝑅𝐿 is the rent extracted from the SOE by the state in 
state-SOE rent-sharing. ACafter   is the average cost of the mega-SOE after sharing out its 
gross rent with the state via corporal taxes; and AC is the initial cost of the mega-SOE 
pre-corporal taxes.  
4.5. Two-stage sequential game between the state and the mega-SOE. To suppose 
that the game involves two-stage decision making, the state always dictates the degree of 
privatisation 𝛽  at the first stage to maximize 𝑅𝐿= wq. Once 𝛽 is given, the manager 
decides the firm’s output to maximize his benefit. We denote Rm as the personal benefit 
that mega-SOE’s manager is able to maximize. We denote 𝜋0 as the total profit yielded 
by this mega-SOE.  
                                                          
43
 H. Sheng and Zhao Nong, China’s State-owned Enterprises: Nature, Performance and Reform 
(Singapore: World Scientific Press, 2013). 
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   We solve this game by backward induction. From the viewpoint of the SOE manager, 
he/she acts after 𝛽 is decided by the state. In other words, the SOE manager can only 
respond to 𝛽 but has no control over 𝛽. So, the final decision is always in the hands of the 
state. 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥⏟
𝑞
 𝑅𝑚 = 𝛽𝜋0 + (1 − 𝛽) 𝑇𝑅𝑚                                                                            (1) 
 
Where 𝜋0 = (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑞) 𝑞 − 𝑘𝑞
2 = 𝑎𝑞 − 𝑏𝑞2 − 𝑘𝑞2. Rearrange the right hand side of (1), 
then convert it to:  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥⏟
𝑞
 𝑅𝑚 = 𝜋0 + 𝐶 (1 − 𝛽)                                                                                    (2) 
 
Plug the profit function and cost function into (2) to obtain: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥⏟
𝑞
 𝑅𝑚 = 𝑎𝑞 − 𝑏𝑞
2 − 𝑘𝑞2 + 𝑘𝑞2(1 − 𝛽)                                                          (3) 
 
Differentiate (3) with respect to q, it results in a Nash equilibrium output set by the 
manager:  
 
𝑞∗ = 𝑄𝐿 =
𝑎
2(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)
                                                                                                   (4) 
 
Where 𝑄𝐿 is the equilibrium output level set by the manager at the second stage of the 
game.  It determines the scale and scope of the SOE that manager chooses to expand. Set 
the second order derivative -2b-2𝛽k < 0, the output level defined by (4) is an optimum 
where the manager’s benefit maximises. Plug (4) into the demand function to obtain a 
Nash equilibrium price operated by this monopolistic SOE: 
 
𝑃𝐿 = 
𝑎(2𝛽𝑘+𝑏)
2(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)
                                                                                                             (5) 
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With (4) and (5) , the maximum economic return  𝑅𝑚  can be obtained as follows: 
 
{
𝜋0 =
𝑎2𝑘(2𝛽−1)+𝑎2𝑏
4(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)2
𝑅𝑚
∗ =
𝑎2
4(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)
           
                                                                                                 (6) 
 
Similarly, the amount of mandatory policy burdens (CS) can be decided:  
 
CS = ⌈a −
𝑎(2𝛽𝑘+𝑏)
2(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)
⌉ ×
𝑎
2(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)
×
1
2
  =  
𝑎2𝑏
8(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)2
                                                          (7) 
 
Here, CS benefits exclusive employees of SOEs, we call it ‘SOE internal social benefit’. 
    Proposition 1: Comparative statics. Based on (4), (5), (6) and (7), we have equilibria 
of price, output, profits, and SOE social benefit with a given degree of privatisation 𝛽 in 
China’s authoritarian market economy:   
 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜕𝑄𝐿
𝜕𝛽
=
−2𝑎𝑘
4(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)2
< 0
𝜕𝑃𝐿
𝜕𝛽
=
2𝑎𝑘𝑏
4(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)2
> 0
𝜕𝜋0
𝜕𝛽
=
8𝑘(8𝑘+𝑏)[𝑎2𝑘(9−2𝛽)]
16(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)4
> 0
𝜕𝑅𝑚
∗
𝜕𝛽
=
−4𝑎2𝑘
16(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)2
< 0
𝜕CS
𝜕𝛽
=
−𝑎2𝑘𝑏
4(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)3
< 0
                                                                       (8) 
          
   Against the neoclassical intuition, according to (8) the optimal output and the degree of 
privatisation are negatively correlated to each other. This is because in an authoritarian 
market economy the manager gains more by output maximisation without privatisation of 
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the SOE.
44
 If privatisation is introduced, the mechanisms of profit maximisation kick in 
to replace output maximisation.
45
 In addition, the manager will have strong disincentives 
for fulfilling policy burdens imposed by the state. The result of (8) also shows a higher 
degree of privatisation leading to higher market prices. For these outcomes, the party-
state will disfavour privatisation of the mega-SOE for the sake of state legitimacy, labour 
employment and price stability.  
    We now move back to the first stage at which the state chooses the degree of 
privatisation 𝛽. Hence, substitute (7) with 𝑅𝐿 = wq and obtain the expression for 𝑅𝐿:  
 
𝑅𝐿 =
𝑎𝑤
2(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)
                                                                                            (9) 
 
Given that all other parameters remain constant, 𝑅𝐿 is a decreasing function in relation to 
the degree of privatization 𝛽.  Thus, the SOE monopolistic rent is maximised when 𝛽∗ = 
0. The maximised amount of rent is 𝑅𝐿
∗ =
𝑎𝑤
2𝑏
 . This leads to Proposition 2.  
    Proposition 2: Resistance to privatisation. In an authoritarian market economy, the 
monopolistic rent is maximized when  𝛽∗ = 0. There are two determinants for rent 
extracted by the state: output and taxes. The larger the output, the greater the gross 
income (and hence gross rent) of the SOE, ceteris paribus. The larger the tax rate (value 
w), the bigger the slice for the state from the cake of the SOE gross income, ceteris 
paribus. This leads to Proposition 3. 
    Proposition 3: Comparative statics. In an authoritarian market economy 
𝑑𝑅𝐿
𝑑𝑤
=
𝑎
2(𝛽𝑘+𝑏)
  
> 0. It means that the higher tax rate imposed by the state, the more rent that the state 
shares with the SOE. If  𝛽∗ = 0, subgame perfect Nash equilibria for prices, output, 
                                                          
44
 Conceptually, the SOE manager benefits from the average output of his/her firm (although his/her 
personal share multiples the average output for SOE workers). So, it is imperative to maximised the firm’s 
total output technically allowed in order to share it out internally. 
45
 Neoclassically, profit is determined by the marginal product of labour. The latter has diminishing returns 
well before a firm’s total output is maximised. When the marginal product of labour drops to zero, the total 
output reaches the maximum. It is thus necessary for a profit-aiming capitalist firm to stop producing well 
before the technically permitted total output is maximised. 
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profits, manager’s personal benefit, state’s economic return and SOE social benefit can 
all be determined. This leads to Proposition 4.  
    Proposition 4: Subgame perfect equilibrium in China’s authoritarian market economy. 
Given that the state decides not to privatize mega-SOEs, the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium can be expressed as follows:  
 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑃𝐿
∗ =
𝑎
2
𝑄𝐿
∗ =
𝑎
2𝑏
𝑅𝑚
∗ =
𝑎2
4𝑏
𝑅𝐿
∗ =
𝑎𝑤
2𝑏
𝐶𝑆∗ =
𝑎2
8𝑏
𝜋0
∗ =
𝑎2(𝑏−𝑘)
4𝑏2
  
𝑊∗ = 𝐶𝑆∗ + 𝜋0
∗ =
𝑎2(3𝑏−2𝑘)
8𝑏2
 
                                                                              (10) 
 
Where 𝑃𝐿
∗ and 𝑄𝐿
∗ are the equilibrium price and output set by the SOE manager when 
privatization is not an option (𝛽∗ = 0). Other equilibrium values follow: 𝑅𝑚
∗  (total 
personal benefit for the manager), 𝑅𝐿
∗ (rent shared by the state), 𝐶𝑆∗(SOE internal social 
benefit), 𝜋0
∗  (total profit of the SOE), 𝑊∗ (aggregate gains for an authoritarian market 
economy). Such Nash dynamics can be illustrated by Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium with SOE Monopoly 
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Notes: (1) 𝑄𝑚 =  monopolistic equilibrium output in a privatised market economy as a 
comparator; 𝑄𝐿  = revenue-maximisation equilibrium output in an authoritarian market 
economy; 𝑄𝑠 = equilibrium output under perfect market competition as a comparator; 𝑃𝑚 
= monopolistic equilibrium price under a privatised market economy; 𝑃𝐿  = revenue-
maximisation equilibrium price in an authoritarian market economy;  𝑃𝑠  = equilibrium 
price under perfect market competition as a comparator.  
(2) AR = average revenue of the mega-SOE; AC = average cost curve for the mega-SOE; 
𝐴𝐶𝑡 = average cost curve, post-tax; MC = marginal cost curve of the mega-SOE; MR 
curve = marginal revenue of the mega-SOE.  
(3) A = profit-maximising equilibrium for the monopolist under a private market 
economy as a comparator; B = revenue-maximising equilibrium for the monopolist SOE 
under the authoritarian market economy. C = social optimum point under perfectly 
competitive market economy as a comparator; D = point corresponding to the 
monopolistic equilibrium price under a fully privatized market economy; E = break-even 
point for monopoly after profit tax where the marginal cost curve crosses; F = price level 
corresponding to the break-even point F, post-tax; G = price level corresponding to the 
break-even point H of the mega-SOE, pre-tax; H = break-even point for the mega-SOE, 
pre-tax.  (4)  GPLKH = gross rent; GFEH =  state rent share; FPLKE = SOE’s rent share. 
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    In the above figure, Qm is the monopolist equilibrium output under a private market 
economy in which there is no institutional zeal for business empire-building. QL is the 
equilibrium output under an authoritarian market economy where business empire-
building, policy burdens as well as rent seeking taking place all at once. QL is necessarily 
larger than Qm . However, neither of the two equilibria is a Pareto-optimum. The 
behaviour of prices is even more interesting.  Although the SOE monopoly price PL is 
higher than its counterpart under perfectly competitive market economy (Ps), it is lower 
than Pm set by the monopolist under a private market economy.   
   Moreover, AR represents the average revenue that a mega-SOE can yield, which is also 
a market demand curve. AC in a U-shaped form is the average cost of the mega-SOE. 
ACt is the average cost after tax. The gap between AC and ACt is the government tax. 
MC stands for choice of technology by the mega-SOE’s. We assume that in the short run 
MC stays unchanged. MR represents marginal revenue which drops faster than AR. At 
Point B, MR reached zero and the SOE’s output maximises. At Point A, the firm 
produces more output than its counterpart in a private market economy which operates at 
Point A. Point C where the market supply curve (overlapping with MC) intersects with 
the market demand curve (overlapping with AR) is Pareto-optimum in a perfectly 
competitive market economy. Point E is the break-even point for monopoly after profit 
tax where the marginal cost curve crosses. Its corresponding price is marked by F.  
Likewise, Point H is the break-even point for the mega-SOE before tax.  Its 
corresponding price is marked by G. The total or gross rent is marked by GPLKH;  the 
state share of the rent by GFEH; and the SOE’s share of the rent by FPLKE. 
 
4.6. Welfare implications 
   Table 4 compares welfare a monopolist firm in three contexts: of an authoritarian 
market economy, of a privatised market economy, and of a perfectly competitive 
economy, respectively. 
 
Table 4. Welfare Comparisons 
 Monopolistic 
equilibrium 
Monopolistic 
equilibrium in a 
Competitive equilibrium 
in a perfectly 
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in an authoritarian 
market economy 
privatised market 
economy 
competitive market 
economy 
Price                 
𝑎
2
              
𝑎(2𝑘+𝑏)
2(𝑘+𝑏)
                
2𝑎𝑘
2𝑘+𝑏
  
Output              
𝑎
2𝑏
               
𝑎
2(𝑘+𝑏)
                
𝑎
 2𝑘+𝑏
  
Manager’s personal 
benefit 
              
a2
4b
               
𝑎2(𝑏+𝑘)
4(𝑘+𝑏)2
              
𝑎2𝑘
(2𝑘+𝑏)2
     
State’s rent             
𝑎𝑤
2𝑏
                             
𝑎𝑤
 2(𝑘+𝑏)
                0 
Firm level social 
benefit  
             
𝑎2
8𝑏
             
𝑎2𝑏
8(𝑘+𝑏)2
             
𝑎2𝑏
2(2𝑘+𝑏)2
    
Profit         
𝑎2(𝑏−𝑘)
4𝑏2
            
𝑎2(𝑘+𝑏)
4(𝑘+𝑏)2
              
𝑎2𝑘
(2𝑘+𝑏)2
     
Social surplus*        
𝑎2(3𝑏−2𝑘)
8𝑏2
            
𝑎2(2𝑘+3𝑏)
8(𝑘+𝑏)2
              
𝑎2
2(2𝑘+𝑏)
  
 
Note:  Social surplus is the sum of both firm level social benefit (consumer surplus) and 
SOE’s profit (producer surplus).  
 
An authoritarian market economy allows the state to have higher economic returns 
than that in a privatised market economy, owing to  
𝑎𝑤
2𝑏
 >
𝑎𝑤
2(𝑘+𝑏)
. This is because the 
latter has less tax revenue when business empire-building is absent, as shown by the 
following diagram. 
  
Figure 8. Monopoly Rent with a Privatised Market Economy Equilibrium after Profit 
Taxes 
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Notes: (1) 𝑄𝐿 is the revenue-maximization equilibrium output under the Authoritarian 
market economy. 𝑄𝑠  is the perfectly competitive equilibrium output. 𝑃𝑚 is the 
monopolistic equilibrium price under a privatised market economy. 𝑃𝐿  is the revenue-
maximization equilibrium pries under the Authoritarian market economy.  𝑃𝑠 is the 
perfectly competitive equilibrium price level. AC is the average cost of this monopolistic 
firm. 𝐴𝐶𝑡  is the average cost curve after the imposition of the profit-tax. The 
monopolistic rent is represented by the area F'PmH'G'. The state’s rent is represented by 
the area E'F'G'D'.  
(2) A' = monopoly profit-maximizing equilibrium point where the MC curve intersects 
with the MR curve. 𝑄𝑚 is the monopolistic equilibrium output under private market 
economy. B' = revenue maximizing equilibrium point under an authoritarian market 
economy. C' = social equilibrium point where the increasing marginal cost curve 
intersects with the demand curve which is AR. D' = break-even point for mega-SOE 
corresponding to the price level indicated by point E', pre-tax. E' = price level at the 
break-even Point D', pre-tax. F' = price level at the break-even point G', post-tax. G' = 
break-even point for the mega-SOE corresponding to price level indicated by Point F', 
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post-tax. H' = point on the demand curve corresponding to the monopolistic equilibrium 
prices level under a privatised market economy. J' = social optimum (Pareto-optimum) 
point under perfect-competitive market economy.  
 
  In Figure 8, the monopolistic equilibrium in a privatised market economy lies at the 
point where the marginal cost curve intersects with marginal revenue curve (Point A). 
Given that the cost shifter w remains unchanged, the output shrinks from 𝑄𝐿 to 𝑄𝑚. The 
state rent share can be computed as 
𝑎𝑤
2(𝑘+𝑏)
. From the state rent-seeking point of view, 
privatisation of a mega-SOE reduces the state rent amount from GFEH in Figure 7 to 
E'F'G'D' in Figure 8.  If the market is in full competition, the equilibrium for the social 
efficiency level reaches Point C, rent disappears. It is in the core interest of the Leninist 
state that this does not happen.  
   Moreover, in an authoritarian market economy the price level is higher than that under 
private monopoly. A Leninist state welcomes a lower price level for the sake of social 
stability. So the state will not permit a monopoly by a private firm but tolerate a 
monopoly by an SOE. 
   Furthermore, the mega-SOE manager is better off than his or her counterpart in a 
private market economy due to the equilibrium ∆ =
a2
4b
−
𝑎2(2𝑏+𝑘)
4(𝑘+𝑏)2
 = 
𝑎2[(𝑘−1)(𝑘+2𝑏)+𝑏2]
4𝑏(𝑘+𝑏)2
 ; k 
> 1, then ∆ > 0. So there is no incentive for the SOE manager to undertake privatisation 
either. The SOE manager also rakes in more personal benefit than a manager of a firm in 
a perfectly competitive market, as 
a2
4b
−
𝑎2𝑘
(2𝑘+𝑏)
2  =
4𝑎2𝑘+a2𝑏2
4𝑏(2𝑘+𝑏)2 
 > 0. 
   Finally, in term of the total social surplus W, the perfectly competitive equilibrium is 
superior among all three economic types. This leads to our last Proposition 5.  
   Proposition 5: Welfare comparison.  
 
{
𝑊𝑠 > 𝑊𝑚, 𝑊𝑠 > 𝑊𝐿  𝑖𝑓 𝑏 ≠ 2𝑘 
𝑊𝐿 > 𝑊𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 < 𝑏
𝑊𝐿 < 𝑊𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 < 2𝑏
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Where 𝑊𝑠 is the total social surplus under the perfectly competitive equilibrium; 𝑊𝐿 is 
that under the authoritarian market economy; 𝑊𝑚 is that under a monopoly in a privatised 
market economy.  
   Proof of Proposition 5: Define ∆= 𝑊𝑠 −𝑊𝑚. 
 
Hence, ∆=
𝑎2
2(2𝑘+𝑏)
−
𝑎2(2𝑘+3𝑏)
8(𝑘+𝑏)2
 =
4𝑎2(𝑘+𝑏)2−[𝑎2(2𝑘+3𝑏)]×(2𝑘+𝑏)
8(𝑘+𝑏)2(2𝑘+𝑏)
 = 
𝑏2
8(𝑘+𝑏)2(2𝑘+𝑏)
 > 0  
 
So 𝑊𝑠 > 𝑊𝑚. 
 
Define  ∆′= 𝑊𝑠 −𝑊𝐿 
 
 ∆′=
𝑎2
2(2𝑘+𝑏)
−
𝑎2(3𝑏−2𝑘)
8𝑏2
=
4𝑎2𝑏2−[𝑎2(3𝑏−2𝑘)(2𝑘+𝑏)]
8𝑏2(2𝑘+𝑏)
 = 
𝑎2(𝑏−2𝑘)2
8𝑏2(2𝑘+𝑏)
 > 0  
 
Now define  ∆′′= 𝑊𝐿 −𝑊𝑚=
𝑎2(3𝑏−2𝑘)
8𝑏2
−
𝑎2(2𝑘+3𝑏)
8(𝑘+𝑏)2
=
𝑎2[(3𝑏−2𝑘)(𝑘+𝑏)2−𝑏2(2𝑘+3𝑏)]
8𝑏2(𝑘+𝑏)2
 
 
Which decides the following:  
 
 ∆′′= 𝑊𝐿 −𝑊𝑚 =
𝑎2𝑘(−𝑏𝑘+2𝑏2−2𝑘2)
8𝑏2(𝑘+𝑏)2
  
 
If ∆′′> 0 (as a > 0, k > 1), −𝑏𝑘 + 2𝑏2 − 2𝑘2 > 0 
 
Hence, 2𝑏2 − 2𝑘2 > 𝑏𝑘 > 0 
 
And, 𝑏2 > 𝑘2; b > k. 
 
If ∆′′< 0 (as a > 0, k > 1), −𝑏𝑘 + 2𝑏2 − 2𝑘2 < 0 
 
Hence, 2𝑏2 − 2𝑘2 < 𝑏𝑘 
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Then, b < 
2𝑘2
2𝑏−𝑘
 
 
As b > 0, and 2b-k > 0, k < 2b.    
 
   An authoritarian market economy can never achieve a Pareto-optimum under free 
market competition where the total social surplus is maximized. Nevertheless, it may 
generate more social surplus than a monopolised market of the private kind. It all 
depends on the demand and supply faced by the firm which is determined by the 
parameters k and b, respectively. Such unambiguity is not surprising as it is still unclear 
in the literature about the welfare gains from revenue-maximisation or profit-
maximisation of a firm.
46
 
 
5. Final remarks 
After four-decade long opening up of the Chinese economy by Deng Xiaoping, and 
against all the neoclassic logic and precedents of the ex-communist economies in Eastern 
Europe, reforms in the state sector in China has visibly halted. So, instead of moving 
forward towards a market economy by the WTO standards, and despite what the Chinese 
official media tell us, China’s economic reforms have stalled in a half-way house. 
Meanwhile the scale and scope of the state-owned enterprises have expanded 
exponentially since circa 1990. This is a huge puzzle which has bewildered many. 
Our findings have revealed the rationale and forces behind China’s reform stalemate: 
monopoly is easy and rent is sweet for both the SOE manager and the Leninist state in a 
win-win game. To create jobs has little bearing in the decision on the excessive growth of 
the SOEs. These are supported by our empirical results, we prove that nearly half of the 
size difference between SOEs and non-SOEs and that between mega-SOEs and lesser 
SOEs is correlated with government tax incentive as the dominant variable. So, the state 
has been pushing excessive growth of China’s SOEs since 1990. We perform tests by 
                                                          
46
 Some economists, such as G. Tullock and M. Wetzstein, argue that a revenue-maximizing firm could be 
superior to a profit-maximizing firm in terms of social welfare; see G. Tullock , ‘Welfare Effects of Sales 
Maximization’ Economic Inquiry, 16/1 (1978), pp. 113-18; M. Wetzsein, Microeconomic Theory: 
Concepts and Connections, 2
nd
 Edition (London, Routledge, 2013).  
 34 
varying mega-SOEs, using different percentiles (90, 75, 50 percentiles or mean). Our 
results remain robust for the available data. 
We take one step further to theorise such a development with subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium between the state and SOEs. Theoretically, neither the state nor the manager 
has incentives to move unilaterally away from the equilibrium. Although this Nash 
equilibrium can never be a Pareto optimum where economic rent does not exist, the SOE 
monopoly is not necessarily worse than a private monopoly in a market economy. It is a 
monopoly nonetheless. As a doubled edged sword, rent yielded by SOEs and shared by 
the state may fuel the ongoing expansion of SOEs, it is a heavy burden on the Chinese 
economy. With such ‘Chinese characteristics’, further economic reforms in China look 
bleak. 
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